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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
and THE BAR
VOLUmE XLV JuNE, 1939 NUmBEr 4
THE HODGES CASE AND BEYOND
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR DAVIS
ROBERT T. DONLEY"
"Labels are bromides and there is no
point in quarreling about them. '' l
In the June, 1938, issue of this Quarterly, Professor Kenneth
C. Davis published a "study in separation of powers",' in the
course of which he contended that the case of Hodges v. Public
Service Commission2 was erroneously decided; that subsequent
cases based upon it are unsound; and predicted the early death of
certain existing statutes if the court persisted in its errors. It will
be the burden of this paper to weigh the soundness of those con-
tentions.
As that one of counsel for Hodges, et al., who formulated the
constitutional arguments upon which the case ultimately turned,
wrote that portion of the brief dealing with them, and argued the
points before the supreme court, the writer feels that he has an
unique interest in these questions and shall, therefore, hereinafter
claim the privilege of sometimes dropping into the first person
singular instead of clinging to the stilted psuedo-formality of the
words "the writer". I hereby deny any pride of paternity but do
claim the right of legitimacy for the offspring. I would not under-
take to make this reply were it not for the fact that, in my opinion,
Tr. Davis has made both negative and positive errors in that: (a)
* Member of the Monongalia County bar; Former Assistant Professor of Law,
West Virginia University.
** LEVY, CARDozo AND FRONTIEms OF LEOAL THININMG (1938) 29.
'Davis, Jvudicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia (1938)
44 W. V.'. L. Q. 270.
2 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931).
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he has not fully stated the arguments in support of the case, and
of those based upon it; (b) nor has he, in every instance, correctly
interpreted statutes which it is claimed will be held unconstitu-
tional.
In order to examine the Hodges case let us first look to the
provisions of the water power act of 1929,3 which was held uncon-
stitutional. We shall have to go back even further and look at the
subject matter with, which that act dealt: water power. It had been
consistently recognized by the water power acts of 19134 and 1915"
that the water power resources were the property of the state. In
two cases,( the supreme court had likewise supported that view,
and so far as can be learned it has never been opposed. These re-
sources were recognized as being tremendously valuable assets of
the state, because of their social and economic potentialities: the
building up of the communities of the state by newi industries
which would be attracted by cheap, readily available electric cur-
rent. As such the "title" (if I may be permitted to use a "label"
to express a concept) to these resources was held by the state and
the sole power of disposal was vested, in the legislature. The
situation was the same as it would have been had the state owned
valuable mineral resources such as coal, oil or gas. The state did
not see fit to adopt the policy of developing and operating this
water power on its own behalf. It was thought that private enter-
prise could and would do the job more efficiently. Accordingly
the licensing scheme was adopted.
Of course, the ultimate policy of the statr. did not spring
Minerva-like to full maturity. In the act of 191'it is evident that
the legislature regarded the issuance of licenses to hydroelectric
companies more in the nature of a special privilege accorded to
private enterprise than as a grant of the state's resources. The
primary concerns of the act were to insure the technical sufficiency
of the proposed project from an engineering standpoint and the
protection of life and property. In 1913, hydroelectric dams were
regarded as dangerous structures. Perhaps the horrors of the Johns-
town flood lingered in memory. The act of 1915 revealed progress
in legislative thinking. In addition to being satisfied as to the tech-
3 W. Va. Acts 1929, c. 58; W. VA. Rv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 31, art. 9, § 1.
4W. Va. Acts 1913, c. 11.
,W. Va. Acts 1915, c. 17.
O Howell v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 78 W. Va. 664, 90 S. E. 105 (1916); Royal
Glen Land & Lumber Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 91 W. Va. 446, 113 S. E.
749 (1922).
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nical sufficiency of the project, the commission was to investigate its
effect upon the economic value and importance of agricultural
lands, forests, coal, oil, gas, mineral deposits and other natural
resources. The commission was to have due regard for public
sentiment in the district affected. Still, however, the emphasis was
upon the economic value of property in the immediate vicinity of
the project, and development was regarded primarily as a matter
of local concern.
Fourteen years later, when the 1929 act was passed the legis-
lature (or others responsible for its enactment) had come to the
full realization that water power was a resource which, even
though the site be actually located in only one county, should be
controlled and utilized for the benefit of the state as a whole. The
act provided that while it was the policy of the state "to encourage
water power development", nevertheless the commission was en-
joined "to weigh, from the standpoint of the state as a whole and
the people thereof, the advantages and disadvantages arising there-
from before acting upon any application for a license; and no
license shall be granted until the commission shall have determined
that the advantages substantially exceed the disadvantages."
To illustrate, let us put a hypothetical case. Suppose that
there is no water power act in existence. The situation, then, is
this: the state owns valuable resources and the legislature is the
sole branch of the government having the power of disposal by
license or otherwise. It could, by special legislative enactment, dis-
pose of this resource or any part of it. Neither the executive nor
the judicial branches would have any voice in the matter. But the
legislature apparently concludes that it possesses neither the time
nor the technical knowledge to deal adequately with the subject.
No one contends that it may not constitutionally delegate this
power of disposal to an administrative agency, an "arm" of the
legislature, an agency created nwt by the constitution but by the
legislature itself. If the legislature had done so, and stopped there,
no constitutional objection would be found. The findings of fact
and decisions as to policy could have been finally and unappeal-
ably delegated to the water power commission. In the absence of a
showing of abuse of discretion or lack of sufficient evidence, no re-
view by a judicial tribunal of any sort would be constitutionally
necessary for no legal "rights" would be involved and none could
be destroyed or injured. No hydroelectric company would have
3
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any "right" to a license. No citizen or body of citizens would have
any "right" to have the license refused.
But the legislature did not stop there. In the act of 1929, it
attempted to place upon the circuit court of Kanawha county the
burden of deciding a pure question of legislative policy: did the
advantages substantially exceed the disadvantages "from the
standpoint of the state as a whole and the people thereof"?
At the time of the application in the Hodges case the incumbent
judge was the honorable and amiable Arthur P. Hudson,
an exceptionally able and experienced judge. It may be asked
(if Mr. Davis insists upon realism in preference to theory)
whether Judge Hudson was an expert in any of the matters
which he had to decide. What did he know of the
technical sufficiency of the plans, of the advantages and disadvan-
tages involved from the standpoint of the state as a whole and its
people? The proper function of a judge, is, in the language of
Chief Justice Taft,7 "confined to definition and protection of
existing rights". Yet the 1929 act required this judge (with no
special training or experience in such matters) to determine ques-
tions of expediency and legislative policy in a matter in which no
"rights" whatever were involved. Moreover, he was to determine
them not upon the record made before the commission, but upon a
trial de novo held in his own court. He was to consider whatever
additional evidence might there be adduced. Of necessity, he was
to form, and in the Hodges case did form, an independent judgment
upon this matter of state concern which involved the disposition
of a resource covering 1415 square miles of watershed.
What, then, became of the commission - the legislative "arm'"
which was to perform for the legislature the function which it
could not itself ably perform? It became a body of figureheads.
The office of the commission became a convenient place for the
taking of evidence which had no conclusive weight whatsoever.
Its judgment upon matters of policy was at most "persuasive".
The applicant might make a weak case before the commission and
the license be denied. Then, while "the public" is lulled into a
state of apathy, an appeal would be taken and a strong case made
before the court, which would grant the license before the public
could be stirred to opposition.
These are not objections going to the "wisdom" of the act.
7 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445, 67
L. Ed. 731 (1922).
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The question is: could the legislature constitutionally have dele-
gated this power in the first instance directly to the circuit court of
Kanawha county, without the interposition of the water power
commission? For, as previously shown, that is the real effect of
the provisions for a trial de novo. To test the validity of the
principle by its possible applications: suppose that the state owned
in fee simple a large body of valuable coal land in IMcDowell
county. The legislature declares a policy of development by leases
upon a royalty basis. It then enacts a statute providing that the
circuit court of Ohio county shall, on behalf of the state, enter
into leases with private operators if it is satisfied that the advan-
tages substantially exceed the disadvantages from the standpoint
of the state as a whole and the people thereof. If this arrangement
be constitutional then it is difficult to imagine any legislative func-
tion which could not be irresponsibly passed on to the already over-
burdened judiciary. Yet this is precisely what was attempted by
indirection under the water power act of 1929 when one looks at
the substance, rather than the form, of the statute.
I shall not here repeat the formal legalistic arguments in sup-
port of the Hodges case. They are set forth amply in Judge
Hatcher's opinion and the reader will be assumed to have read
the case. Let us rather proceed to consider the objections advanced
by Mr. Davis.
At the outset of his discussion, Mr. Davis says that "Before
1931, the role of separation of powers in the West Virginia cases
was of much greater consequence in the writing of opinions than
in the decision of cases. In the tax cases the talk seems to revolve
around seven labels, but most of the holdings are in harmony with
results that would be reached by a more pragmatic approach."'
In other words, the "seven labels", like the seven dwarfs in Snow
White, whistled while they worked. This leads Mr. Davis to his
only "pragmatic" objection to the Hodges ease and those based
upon it, namely, that "the doctrine of separation of powers has
brought about consequences which from the standpoint of efficiency
in government may well be considered unfortunate. '
No proof is offered in support of this conclusion, nor is there
any definition of what constitutes "efficiency in government". On
the contrary, the Hodges case would seem to make for efficiency if
by that word is meant (a) speed in administration; (b) finality of
8 Davis, supra n. 1, at 352.
9 id. at 353.
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decision; and (c) the superior judgment of qualified experts. For,
in order to attain these ends the legislature need only set up the
water power commission, accord finality to its findings of fact and
conclusions of policy, and omit the provision for appeal to the
circuit court. If it is efficiency that is desired, nothing could be
more inefficient than a system which provided for (1) a hearing
before a body of three experts upon one mass of evidence, followed
by (2) another hearing before one nonexpert upon another mass
of evidence, followed by (3) a third hearing (appeal to the supreme
court) before five nonexperts, upon the latter mass of evidence.
Yet, because this incongruous system was stricken down by the
Hodges case, Mr. Davis complains that from the standpoint of
efficiency in government the decisions "may well be considered un-
fortunate." Of theoretical objections to the decision, Mr. Davis
enumerates seven:
(1) The court did not give effect to the qualifications w7hich
most writers placed upon the acceptance of the theory of separation
of powers.10
The "true meaning", according to Mr. Davis, is that "the
whole power of one of these departments [of government] should
not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power
of either of the other departments."" This is quoted from Story,
who cites The Federalist, Blackstone and Montesquieu. One is
slightly puzzled to find Mr. Davis relying upon such authors,
especially Montesquien twice removed, when one has previously
read remarks such as these:
". . . If it is expedient from the standpoint of convenience
and efficiency in government that a court should have power
in its discretion to modify a legislative order of a commission,
should a jurisprudence of conceptions founded upon the
writings of an eighteenth century French philosopher be al-
lowed to stand in the way?""
Presumably no criticism can be directed at Montesquien's works
by reason of the fact that he was a Frenchman, nor because he
happened to live in a century more graceful than ours. Again:
"It seems almost too obvious to state that a problem so
essentially practical cannot be properly solved either by legal
10 Id. at 355.
11 Ibid., quoting STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1891), c. VII.
12 Ia. at 306.
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niceties or by abstract thought. Above all, the answer is not
to be found in Montesquieu ! "
I should be quite willing to leave it at that. But if the answer
is not to be found in Montesquieu (although Story says that it is)
neither shall wisdom die with Blackstone and Madison. However,
if we meet the argument on its own ground-the "whole power"
-the Hodges case is sound in the modern application of that
principle.
It is true that Madison, in No. 47 of The Federalist, argued
that the "whole power" interpretation should be taken literally.
He was, however, placing his own construction upon Montesquieu's
words:
" 'There can be no liberty where the legislative and execu-
tive powers are united in the same person, or body of magis-
trates' or 'if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive.' "
And, as Madison further points out, Montesquieu was commenting
upon the British Constitution which was to him "what Homer has
been to the didactic writers on epic poetry."
A literal application of Madison's "whole power" interpre-
tation of Montesquieu would result in the practical destruction
of the doctrine of separation of powers. For, the doctrine would
not be violated unless the entire aggregate of powers of one branch
of the government were vested in another branch.
It is interesting to note, too, that Madison was primarily con-
cerned with the encroachment by one branch of the government
upon another branch. In No. 48 of The Federalist he remarks that
"the legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." He
inquires into the adequacy of "these parchment barriers against
the encroaching spirit of power."
He did not, apparently, contemplate the spirit of relinquish-
nent of legislative power, as exemplified in the water power act.
It would seem, however, that the fundamental objectives of the doc-
trine of separation of powers may be as effectively subverted by
abdication as by encroachment. The judicial branch must as firm-
ly guard against the increase of its own powers as it must resist
legislative attempts at their reduction.
It thus seems to me that if the phrase "whole power" means
13 Id. at 311.
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anything for us today, it means that whole power as applied to a
certain subject matter. The whole power of disposing of the water
power resources was relinquished by the legislature and transferred
to the circuit court of Kanawha county by the act of 1929. It was
not a mere "review" of the action of the commission in order to
determine whether it had acted in accordance with the law and the
evidence and within the bounds of legitimate discretion. It was
expressly a trial de izovo.
The real objection must be upon some other ground. Thus,
we read:
"The answers to 20th century questions.., must be found
in modern experience, and not in the abstract writings of an
18th century French philosopher who speculated about other
problems and other conditions in another place at another
time. "14
I interpret this to mean, in bolder language, that the strict
doctrine of separation of powers is outmoded. It once had validity
but it no longer has. Admitting that it is in the constitution, how
then shall we get rid of it - how shall we get it out of the consti-
tution? By formal amendment? No one suggests that. The only
other way is by judicial emasculation: a gelding is more tractable
than a stallion and may run a better race. After all, it is the
race and not the horse that is important -in the twentieth century.
The test is not whether the constitution has been violated but
whether it is convenient to ignore the violation. Chief Justice
John Marshall (who, I take it, is outmoded too) once asked to
what purpose limitations are imposed and committed to writing if
they may at any time be exceeded by those intended to be re-
strained.1"
I confess that the cult of modernity repels me, perhaps because
it is essentially hypocritical. It says one thing and does another.
The constitution does not mean today what it meant yesterday,
nor the day before. It shifts and changes under the skillful
14 Id. at 371.
11... At least in the English-speaking world we must have a balance between
stability and change, between the general security and the individual life, be-
tween society and the individual, between regimented co-operation and free
individual initiative and activity, between nation and state, between state and
neighborhood, between legislative and executive and judiciary....
"It is a mistake to think of balance as an obsolete idea of the eighteenth
century." Pound, Some Implcations of Becent Legislation (1939) 45 W.
VA. L. Q. 205, 207.
15 Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 5 L. Ed. 137 (U. S. 1803).
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manipulation of the skin-of-a-living-thought school of juris-
prudence.' There are, to me, interests other than that of ex-
pediency to be safeguarded. One of them is stability of the law.
Another is predictability. A third is the assurance that even the
judges are governed by the law; tritely, that this is a "government
of laws and not of men"; that they decide cases upon principles
as they conscientiously understand them and not according to what
may seem at the mment expedient, and presented with a voice-of-
Jacob-hand-of-Esau claim to birthright, disingenuously rationalized
into a principle which, once postulated, is easily defended. In a
word, respect for law depends in large measure upon confidence -
faith, if you like (viewing the law as a kind of theology) - in the
motives of the judges. It is preferable that a principle of law be
honestly misinterpreted or misapplied without regard to the result
reached, than that an expedient result be had through a dishonest
bending of the principle to justify it. That, in brief, is my ob-
jection to the statement that answers to twentieth century questions
must be found in modern experience: it is a counsel of conscious
intellectual hypocrisy. All this is now old, unoriginal, plat-
itudinous and somewhat of a bore. So, too, is all other orthodox
theology. Perhaps there is a middle ground- "Somewhere be-
tween worship of the past and exaltation of the present, the path
of safety will be found."' 7
(2) Previous cases had upheld the performance of nonjudicial
functions by circuit courts.15
There is no doubt about the correctness of this statement.
The supreme court admitted it. If, however, those cases were in-
correctly decided (as the court indicates), and if, as is conceded,
the matters therein dealt with were of only local concern, the ques-
tion becomes this: should the court persist in its previous errors
and extend them to new and different subject matter? The extent
of the application of a principle is one of degree. Even if one
10 See Holmes, J., in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 38 Ct. 158, 62 L.
Ed. 372 (1918).
17 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1925) 160.
"Another idea which had held a chief place in the polity of English-speaking
peoples was that one will was not to be subjected arbitrarily to the will of
another . . . This was the idea behind our bills of rights and behind the
doctrine our legal historians have been calling 'the supremacy of the law';
a doctrine once thought to be the birthright of the American but now sneered
at frequently by young lawyers newly appointed to give counsel to adminis-
trative bureaus and imbued with the idea of the supremacy of the bureau."
Pound, supra n. 14, at 208.
is Davis, supra n. 1, at 356,
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concedes that the previous cases were correctly decided, the ques-
tion still remains as to how far and in what circumstances and as
applied to what subject matter, their principles should be extended.
This, as is everywhere admitted, is the very essence of the judicial
function, and it is only a matter of individual opinion as to whether
a particular decision involving a question of degree is either wrong
or right. Air. Davis is, of course, entitled to his own opinion. But
it is just that, and nothing more. As a demonstration of eternal
verities as to which there can be but one conviction, the argument
wholly fails.
(3) The court implicitly recognized that the statute in the
Hodges case is indistinguishable from the statutes upheld in pre-
vious cases.'0
This statement is not borne out by a fair analysis of Judge
Hatcher's opinion. The distinctions between the water power act
and the statutes dealing with incorporation of towns and with ap-
peals from the valuations fixed by boards of equalization and re-
view are so plain as to be unmistakable. First, the water power
act set up a system for the disposal of a natural resource owned by
the state. Second, the decision of the circuit court was to be based
upon the advantages and disadvantages of that disposal from the
standpoint of the state as a whole and the people thereof. This is
not merely a question of "the geographical extent of the interest
aroused in a function." 20  It is not geography, i.e., the physical
extent of the interest, that is important, but rather the economic and
social effect upon the entire commonwealth -a matter completely
different, both in character and degree, from the questions of
whether a town should be incorporated or whether the tax valu-
ations in any one county are correct. This, and no less, is what
the court meant by the words "statewide interest".
(4) The water power act did not require the circuit court to
make a determination of policy.2
The foundation of this argument, is that the legislature had
already determined the state's policy to be "to encourage water
power development." The fallacy in this point seems obvious and,
not to labor it unduly, I simply state that the declaration of a broad,
general policy does not overcome the declaration of a narrower,
more specific policy. It was as much the policy of the legislature
29 Id. at 358.
20 bid.
21 Id. at 359.
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not to encourage development unless the evidence affirmatively
showed that the advantages substantially outweighed the disadvan-
tages in each specific case, as it was its policy to encourage develop-
ment generally. In truth, the latter was subordinate to the former,
for if a proper showing could not be made then the application for
license must be denied however much it might otherwise fulfill the
general requirement of development. The determination of this
specific and paramount policy was, as previously shown, committed
(indirectly in form, but directly in substance and effect) to the
circuit court. To say, as Mr. Davis does, that the principal function
of that court was "to determine whether or not this declared policy
would be furthered" and that the court "was only to apply that
policy to a given set of facts", is merely playing with words. If
the substance of a power is embodied in the function of "applying"
it, then for all purposes (except quibbling) the application is the
power itself.22
(5) The function performed by thte circuit court was striking-
ly similar to its function in ordinary litigation.3
I confess myself unable to understand this point. Hitherto, I
had supposed that in "ordinary litigation" the function of a circuit
court was to adjudicate "rights" and enforce correlative "duties"
between parties. Perhaps this is only a slavish attachment to
"labels". There is usually process or notice of some kind; plead-
ings are filed; a determination of facts is made; a judgment is
rendered, to be enforced by appropriate sanctions. All this may
be only the machinery that turns the wheels of justice, and there-
fore unimportant in determining the abstract nature of a function.
Is it the function of circuit courts "in ordinary litigation" to grant
to private enterprise a natural resource belonging to the state? Do
circuit courts ordinarily determine the specific applications of the
policy of the state in disposing of its natural resources? My ex-
perience and observation have been that they do not, and in the
absence of something more persuasive than Mr. Davis' assertion that
they do, I shall hold to that opinion.
(6) The separation of powers clause, properly interpreted,
does not forbid a court to exercise a power somewhat judicial and
22 Compare the rule that a life estate coupled with a power of disposal
amounted to a fee simple, prior to W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 16,
and Notes (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 288, and (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 422.
23 Davis, supra n. 1, at 360.
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somewhat legislative, if the legislature sees fit to confer such a power
upon the court.2
This proposition as stated begs the question. It must first be
determined whether or not the legislature may constitutionally con-
fer power as it sees fit. What it was meant to assert, one assumes,
is that the separation of powers clause should be so interpreted as
to authorize the legislature to confer upon a court powers some-
what legislative and somewhat judicial. Why? Because, says Mr.
Davis, "if there is to be efficiency in government the separation of
powers principle cannot be inflexibly applied to such borderland
or unclassifiable powers." I have already commented upon the
unsoundness of the "efficiency" argunent as applied to the water
power act. But on principle I disagree with the theory in its
broader applications. The argument of efficiency is the argument
of convenience or necessity: a court should have such-and-sueb
powers because it is expedient for it to have them. We have it
from Chief Justice Hughes that:
"While emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.""
That sentence has a beautiful ring but the more often one
reads it the more he is impressed by its Edward Learian quality.
It is a neat example of the judicial method of having your cake
and eating it too. As a result, we have standing side by side the
federal constitutional provision that no state shall pass a law im-
pairing the obligation of a contract, and the Minnesota act doing so.
It is obvious, of course, that in addition to having a ring, it is one
- a perfect circle - and, as Mr. Justice Sutherland pointed out
in his dissenting opinion:
"... I can only interpret what is said on that subject as
meaning that while an emergency does not diminish a re-
striction upon power it furnishes an occasion for diminishing
it; and this, as it seems to me, is merely to say the same thing
by the use of another set of words, with the effect of affirming
that which has just been denied." 2
Chief Justice Hughes' words were mere lip-service: the high
priest repeating the ritual which he did not follow in practice.
In borderline cases decision becomes little more than a battle of
241bid.
25H ome Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426, 54 S. Ct. 231,
78 L. Ed. 413 (1934).
26 Id. at 472.
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words and one gets cynically accustomed to the unconscious hypoc-
risy with which they are employed. However, other cases, in
which should be included the Hodges case, are not of this character.
If not purely legislative, certainly the functions which the circuit
court was to perform under the water power act were preponder-
antly legislative to such a degree as to call for application of the
words of the written constitution - written as it is - not as we
might write it if we had in mind only, or primarily, the question
of efficiency.
(7) The plausible explanation of tkte Hodges case is that the
court was influenced by extra-legal factors.7
This is hardly an argument at all and Mr. Davis does not
seriously contend that it is. But if it were, he should be the last
to object to that method of deciding a case, since he has emphasized
so strongly the argument of expediency and efficiency -purely
"extra-legal" considerations. It is conceded that the method exists,
although courts deny it. The denial is both expected and then
ridiculed by the professors of law. It is all good, clean fun and
the game would be spoiled if we changed the rules.
The first part of this paper has been devoted to an attempt
to refute Professor Davis' argument upon the traditional ground of
formal logic which takes the shape of a syllogism. Upon this
ground, there is no doubt of the validity of the conclusion reached,
purely as logic, in the Hodges case. The syllogism runs in this wise:
Major premise: The constitution forbids the courts to exer-
cise legislative powers.
Minor premise: The power to determine whether, in any
specific case, resources of the state should be disposed of is a legis-
lative power.
Conclusion: Therefore, this power cannot be exercised by the
courts.
The syllogism is declared unsound by attacking the validity
of both premises. It is said, first, that the constitution does not
mean what it says, both because complete separation of powers is
only the expression of an ideal, impossible of perfect attainment
in practice, and because it has been interpreted otherwise in other
cases. The answer is that because an ideal cannot be fully achieved
is no reason for not achieving it as completely as possible; and that
previous interpretations were unsound and the question may be
27 Davia, supra n. 1, at 361.
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determined without reference to them. Secondly, the minor
premise is said to be untrue because the application of the general
policy of the state to a specific state of facts is really a judicial
function. The answer to this has already been indicated with suf-
ficient clarity.
The point of cleavage is now plain, and may be stated as fol-
lows: admitting that the separation of powers clause is open to
interpretation by reason of the fact that complete separation can-
not be attained in practice, how should it be interpreted? Two an-
swers to this question have been made:
The Court: Strictly, so that the ideal expressed by the clause
may be attained as nearly as possible consonant with the practical
considerations involved.
Mr. Davis: Liberally, because practical considerations are of
more importance than ideals. Anyway, the ideal is an eighteenth
century one and ought not to be a twentieth century one.
Thus, what appeared on both sides to be cold logic are now
seen in their true light as value-concepts. There is not much point
in arguing with one about his values. Nor can it be said that by
any objective standard there has been "correct" thinking on one
side only.
"Legal thinking is never a simple syllogistic deduction, but
is to some extent a determination of social ends. It according-
ly runs afoul of all the logical difficulties of such deter-
mination... ""2
It is therefore submitted that so much of Mr. Davis' argument
as depends upon logic - and I include here the appeals to
precedent, history, the "intention of the framers", commentators,
and the like-utterly fails to convince. We are, therefore, re-
duced to a consideration of his "value-concepts". Even if one
concedes that in some cases practical considerations must prevail
over adherence to ideals, there remains to be determined what
those cases are. I cannot agree that there is any overbalancing prac-
tical reason for insisting that findings of fact and. the exercise of
discretion by an administrative body miest be reviewed by the
courts - where there is no showing of lack of evidence or abuse of
discretion - in order to have "efficiency". Indeed, the contrary
would seem more reasonable: commit such matters to experts,
eliminate the delay and expense of rehearing and reconsideration
28 BURTr, PRiNCIPLES AND PROBLEmS OF RIGHoT TINKING (1928) 490.
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by nonexperts. Thus, the argument in so far as it depends upon
expediency alone, also fails to convince. It is submitted, therefore,
that the Hodges case is sound, both as to the logical structure of the
opinion and as to its practical results. I shall next proceed to dis-
cuss the cases which have followed it, bearing in mind that what-
ever may be the conclusion as to their soundness or unsoundness,
the correctness of the Hodges case is in no wise affected thereby.
CASES BASED UPON THE HODGES CASE
(1) Danielley v. City of Princeton.29 Mr. Davis asks: Why
is the exercise of discretion as to the proper method of sewage dis-
posal executive? I confess (with becoming modesty) that I do not
know; I am quite as puzzled as he. Nevertheless, I submit that the
case was correctly decided. Mr. Davis does not mention (and ap.
parently considers as unimportant) the fact that the statute" em-
powered the circuit court to consider additional evidence intro-
duced before it. Is the effect, then, the same as if there had been
an express provision for trial de novo, which necessarily would re-
quire the court to render an independent judgment upon both the
facts and the law ?
What is the effect of a provision in such statutes that the cir-
cuit court shall either (a) have power to consider additional evi-
dence or (b) conduct a trial de novo? It may be conceded that,
purely as logic, the power to consider additional evidence does not
necessarily mean that a trial de novo is intended. Nor does a trial
de novo necessarily mean that the court is to act as a commission
and substitute its judgment for the latter's. It is possible to argue
that the legislature intended that the findings of the commission
should be (1) prima, facie correct, or (2) entitled to the same
weight as the additional evidence, or (3) given no weight whatso-
ever.
When, however, as a practical matter, the circuit judge de-
cides the case, it is impossible to analyze his mental processes and
to determine what factors and what evidence were uppermost in
his mind. It is likely that if the commission is an able and ex-
perienced one the judge will be inclined to affirm its findings. On
the other hand, if the commission is incompetent, no legislative
mandate can, by the use of magic words such as "prima facie",
prevent the judge from formulating an independent judgment.
29 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S. E. 620 (1933) ; Note (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 336.
00 W Va, Aets 1929, c. 14; W. VA, Rzv. CODE (1931) c. 16, art, 11,
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These and other imponderables will, in varying degrees, enter into
the decision of each case.
It is my contention here-and it may well be erroneous-
that whenever a statute either empowers the court to hear addi-
tional evidence or to conduct a trial de novo, that the legislature
intended that court to formulate a new and independent judgment
upon the merits of the whole case and, if necessary, to substitute
its judgment for that of the commission. In brief, to perform the
same function that the commission performs- to act as a Com-
mission.
Furthermore, if that be correct, then the court is acting non-
judicially and therefore unconstitutionally, regardless of whether
it has only the power to reverse or to affirm or whether it has the
more extensive power to "modify" or to "make the order the com-
mission should have made."
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Company" is one of the
leading cases enunciating the doctrine that if a court has power
to make the order the commission should have made then it is exer-
cising legislative power. But it seems to me that this is not the true
test. If the form of the order, or whether it is entered 'by the cou4t
or by the commission, be made the criterion then it is a highly
artificial one. There is no substantial difference- except in form
-between the court's entering the order which the commission
should have entered, and the court's reversal of the commission's
order with directions to enter a new order. In either case, it is in
reality the court that is solving the administrative problem. The
true test should be not who enters the order, but what is the nature
of the function exercised. Thus, in commenting upon the Keller
case, a later case32 said:
"There [in the Keller case] this court held that the function as-
signed to the courts of the District in the statutory proceeding
was not judicial in the sense of the Constitution, but was legis-
lative and advisory, because it was that of instructing and aid-
ing the commission in the exertion of power which was
essentially legislative."
On the other hand, it has been held that although the court
was empowered to consider new evidence, nevertheless,
31 261 U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445, 67 L. Ed. 731 (1922).
"2 Federal Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 468, 50
S. Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969 (1930). Italics supplied,
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"The legislature never intended that the court should put
itself in the place of the commission, try the matter anew as
an administrative body, substituting its findings for those of
the commission. A statute which so provided would be un-
constitutional as a delegation to the judiciary of non-judicial
powers. ",
33
It was admitted that "This presents a situation somewhat
anomalous in that the court may receive evidence in order to de-
termine whether findings of fact are sustainable. ... .
It would seem that the only way by which to avoid this
anomaly is a flat holding that the legislature meant what its
language reasonably imports and that such statutes are unconsti-
tational.
Cases of this type holding that an independent judicial re-
examination cannot constitutionally be made by the courts are
seemingly in conflict with the celebrated Ben Avon case, discussed
at length by Mir. Davis. While the present status of the Ben Avon
case may be doubtful, there is authority for contending that its
principles apply only where it is claimed that confiscation of prop-
erty will result. 5
To return to the Danielley case: the foregoing observations have
been made in order to explain the emphasis which I have placed-
and in discussing subsequent cases will again place--upon the effect
of provisions in our statutes for the taking of additional evidence
before the circuit court. As I understand Mr. Davis' views, he
attaches no importance to such provisions but looks rather to the
test supposedly laid down in the Keller and other cases: does the
court have the power to make the order the commission should have
made.
In the Danielley case the entire statute was properly thrown
out, since to uphold part of it would have been to upset the whole
legislative scheme. In addition, there was no "saving clause."
(2) Baker v. County Court.3 The criticism of this case seems
to be sound. There was nothing in the statute 7 which either ex-
pressly or by necessary implication required the circuit court to
3' State v. Great Northern Ry., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N. W. 247 (1915).
34 Id. at 60.
3r See Modeste v. Connecticut Co., 97 Conn. 453, 117 AtI. 494 (1922), denying
the constitutionality of an appeal to the courts from an order of the public
utilities commission refusing application for a license to operate a jitney over
certain routes.
36 112 W. Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932).
37NV. Va. Acts 1919, c. 57; W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 7, art. 7, § 7.
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"substitute its judgment for that of the county court". The statute
should have been construed, if possible, in such manner as to up-
hold it. There was no provision for the taking of additional
evidence. The circuit court was to "determine the equity" of the
county court's allowances to the sheriff. These words are used
quite ambiguously for the reason that "equity" is not defined,
nor is it specified how or upon what evidence the question is to be
determined. If the circuit court could properly consider only the
evidence adduced before the county court then it could "determine
the equity" (without substituting its judgment for that of the
county court) by finding that the county court's judgment was not
inequitable, i.e., was supported by substantial evidence and not
arbitrary, even though the circuit judge, had he been deciding the
matter in the first instance, would have reached a different con-
clusion. Famiiliar analogies are apparent: the weight given to a
jury's verdict upon conflicting evidence; or to the findings of a
commissioner in chancery; or to the decison of a circuit court in
granting a new trial. In other words, the supreme court might
well have construed the statute to mean that upon the appeal the
circuit court was confined to the case supposed in the opinion:
".. . It may be conceded that if the county court should fix
an amount which would be unreasonable, plainly capricious
and arbitrary, there would be a clear abuse of discretionary
power, and the courts would have jurisdiction to give re-
lief .... "
It should be noted, however, that the entire statute was not
held unconstitutional. Only the appeal provision was invalidated.
(3) Staud v. Silt. 8  What are the elements necessary for
judicial action. Mr. Davis indicates that a court may act judicially
although there is an absence of parties, someone aggrieved, an
issue, and a cause of action or a ground of equitable relief. I
submit that this is an unsound criticism. The circuit court did
not perform a judicial function for the reason that its decree con-
firming the trustee's sale did not have the finality and binding effect
which is accorded to other decrees or judgments--in a word, it
was not a decree at all because nobody was bound by it. The point
is not that the function performed is nonjudicial in nature-con-
cede that it is judicial-but rather that functions otherwise judicial
in nature are not invested with that character unless they be per-
3s 114 W. Va. 208, 171 S. E. 428 (1933).
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formed in a certain manner and with some significance.3 9 It is
fundamental that due process of law requires notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before any binding effect can be given to a
decree or judgment. Under the procedure set up by the statute,
the trustee could file his petition without making parties, or giving
notice to, either the grantor or the beneficiary of the deed of trust.
The decree would not even protect the trustee in a subsequent
suit by either the grantor or the beneficiary, seeking to charge him
with liability for breach of any duty imposed by law upon him as
a fiduciary under the trust. If nobody is bound by the decree
then it does not represent judicial action in any but the Pick-
wickian sense.
This fact distinguishes the case from the others cited by
Mr. Davis. His choice of the "guardianship statute ' 40 as an ex-
ample is especially unfortunate. Of it he says: "There are no
parties, no aggrieved person, no issue, no cause of action, no ground
of equitable relief." But, if one reads to the end of the statute
he will find that the proceedings thereunder for the sale of, or
loan upon, an infant's real estate must conform to Chapter 37,
Article 1 of the CODE. This section does provide for parties. An
issue is made upon the allegations of the petition or bill of the
guardian by the filing of an answer of a guardian ad litem for the
infant, and of the infant himself, if over fourteen years of age.
Process or notice is served. The court hears evidence upon the
issue thus made up. The decree has finality, for the guardian under
his bond, the purchaser of the property, or the creditor taking
the same as security, all are protected as against subsequent attack
by the infant.
EXISTING LEGISLATION OF DOUBTFUL CONSTITUTIONALITY
(1) CODE, 30-6-7. This statute provides that the circuit court
shall, on appeal from the decision of the board, "hear and deter-
mine such case as in other cases of appeal". There is no provision
for the introduction of new evidence in the circuit court, nor is
it expressly made a trial de novo. Construing the statute in such
manner as to uphold it, the supreme court might well hold here also
39 In Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 74, 47 S. Ct. 282,
71 L. Ed. 541 (1926), speaking of the jurisdiction of constitutional courts
it was said: ". . . their jurisdiction is limited to cases and controversies
presented in such form, with adverse litigants, that the judicial power is
capable of acting upon them, and pronouncing and carrying into effect a
judgment between the pates.. ."
40 W. VA. REV. CODB (1931) c. 44, art. 10, § 13.
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that upon such appeal the circuit court is not empowered to render
an independent judgment, but is limited to deciding whether or
not the action of the board was arbitrary or without evidence to
support it. The obstacle to such a holding is, of course, Baker v.
County Court." If the court adheres to that decision, Mr. Davis'
conclusion seems sound, except that, if the Baker case is followed,
the entire statute would not be invalid, but only the appeal pro-
vision.
(2) CoDE, 16-10-12. Mr. Davis' conclusion seems correct
with referenice to this statute, especially because there is an express
provision for the taking of new evidence before the circuit court.
(3) CODE, 16-1-13. Here one finds what is submitted to be
a vital omission from Mr. Davis' quotation of the statute. In his
article he quotes only part of it, thus:
"Any person aggrieved by any order of the public health
council . may ... appeal to the circuit court. .. ."
The statute adds, following the last words above quoted:
"of the county wherein his property rights or personal liber-
ties have been affected."
Thus, in order for there to exist a circuit court to which an appeal
may be taken, there must be an aggrieved party whose property
rights or personal liberties have been injuriously affected. Plainly,
this requirement is not merely jurisdictional,, i.e., for the mere
purpose of determining the venue of the appeal, but is also sub-
stantive. Unless there is a party who has suffered such injury,
no appealable issue is presented. And, if presented, the function
of the court on the appeal is limited to the definition and protection
of existing rights of person or property- the essence of judicial
function. There is thus no warrant for asserting that on such an
appeal the circuit court would be performing legislative functions.
In fact, Mr. Davis does not make that assertion. But unless it is im-
plied, then there is no point whatever in his contention, for he
bases it upon the Baker case, which is authority for the proposition
that the circuit court cannot perform legislative functions.
(4) CODE, 22-4-13. Here one finds a misreading of the statute.
Mr. Davis says:
41 112 W. Va. 406, 164 S. E. 515 (1932).
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"Provision is made for appeal to the circuit court, which
'shall promptly decide the matter in controversy as may seem
to it to be just and right'."
A reading of the statute shows that the above quoted language
refers not to the circuit court, but to the supreme court of appeals.
The statute does not so provide as to appeals to the circuit court
nor is it specified whether additional evidence may there be ad-
duced. There is no provision for trial de novo.
As previously indicated (but for the Baker case) the supreme
court might well hold here also that the statute should be construed
in such manner as to uphold it, and that the circuit court is em-
powered only to determine whether or not the action of the depart-
ment of mines was arbitrary or without evidence to support it.
Moreover, it would seem that section 12 contains its own pro-
vision for appeal. There is no provision for the introduction of
additional evidence in the circuit court. Section 11, setting forth
the procedure whereby a coal operator may obtain permission to
drill within two hundred feet of a well, does, however, contain an
express provision for appeal, the procedure upon which shall con-
form to that set forth in section 4. The latter section provides for
the introduction of additional evidence before the circuit court. It
is therefore arguable that this section requires an independent
judgment by the court and is, accordingly, invalid under the
Hodges case. But Mr. Davis' conclusion that "all legislation in
chapter 22 of the Code with respect to far-reaching functions of the
department of mines, or, at least, a large portion of such legislation,
depending upon separability, is unconstitutional!" is itself too far-
reaching. Under familiar principles, depending, of course, upon
separability, only parts of article 4 appear to be invalid -not the
remainder of chapter 22.
(5) CODE, 32-1-19. The point here turns entirely upon the
construction of, or meaning attached to, the word "modify". It
is impossible to imagine all future situations which might arise in
connection with the administration of this statute. It is, however,
conceivable that cases might arise in which only part of the facts
found by the commissioner of securities are supported by evidence.
If such facts were irrelevant to the issues, or if relevant were not
so material as to be decisive thereof, the court might "modify" the
order of the commissioner in so far as it purported to find such
facts, and then aflirm as to the remainder of the order. It would
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seem farfetched to declared that the court would thereby perform
a legislative function. It is arguable that the supreme court could
and should interpret the word "modify" as having this limited
sense, i.e., as meaning the power to strike from an order improper
or impertinent matter, but not to alter the mandate itself. I freely
admit that such an interpretation does violence to grammar, since
the power is to modify "in whole or in part." Conceding that such
power to "modify in whole" cannot constitutionally be granted, -4 2
surely it is a separable part of the act, and the remainder thereof
granting the power to affirm or to set aside the commissioner's
order, should be upheld. If so, the point is of little practical im-
ortanee.
(6) CODE, 30-1-9 Here, again, is found an omission of what
is submitted to be a vital part of the statute. It is provided that
in determining the case, the circuit court shall do so "upon the
record of the proceedings before the board." There is no provision
for new evidence or for trial de novo. The statute, like others pre-
viously discussed, might well be upheld (but for the Baker case)
by limiting the function of the circuit court to determining whether
the action of the board was arbitrary or without evidence to sup-
port it.
THE SUMMING UP
To begin with, is it true that the Hodges case and those follow-
ing it have rendered the theory of separation of powers "positively
harmful"? That depends, of course, upon what one means by
those words: harmful to whom or to what; to legal theory or to the
welfare of the people of West Virginia?
There is no attempt to demonstrate that the latter is true.
Here, if we would go beyond the court's opinions - which the rules
of the game do not permit -we might find that, for example, the
decision in the Hodges case was distinctly beneficial to the state
and its people. It would be unfair for me to comment upon that
question. Besides, I am prejudiced. I do not know what were
the practical effects of the Danielley, Baker and Staud cases, but
presumably they were not too bad. The same observation may be
made as to the fate of the questioned statutes, for it would be a
simple matter to re-enact them without their invalid features. As
was said by Cardozo, J., in Matter of Doyle:'3
42 The point is doubtful. See Mr. Davis' comment in footnote 303, at p. 368.
43 257 N. Y. 244, 268, 177 N. E. 489, 498 (1931).
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"... A community whose judges would be willing to give it
whatever law might gratify the impulse of the moment would
find in the end that it had paid too high a price for relieving
itself of the bother of awaiting a session of the Legislature
and the enactment of a statute in accordance with established
forms. "
But, says Mr. Davis, there has been raised "a constitutional bar-
rier in every case to a complete judicial review of nonjudicial ac-
tion, no matter how great the practical need for such review may
be."
To this there are two answers: first, there is no evidence of
such practical need; second, there is no necessity for a "complete"
judicial review. If the legislature will, in creating administrative
boards, make sufficient provisions for their functioning it may wise-
ly make their decisions upon facts and their exercise of discretion
final, leaving to the courts only to decide whether actions have
been arbitrary or without substantial evidential basis- something
a great deal less than "complete" review.44 For, if an administra-
tive body makes honest mistakes in its rulings, but has reasonable
evidence to support it, how do we improve anything by letting a
judge overrule it? He also may be mistaken as to nonjudicial ques-
tions, and if we must choose between guessers, three are more like-
ly to be right than one. If it is gambling we want then we should
follow the gambler's rule and play the averages. 45
If the practical effects are no more serious than I have sug-
gested, what is all this talk about? Legal theory-that is all.
Here we approach "brooks too broad for leaping", but a few ob-
servations may be made without unduly prolonging this paper.
Perhaps one can attach too much importance to theories. Thus,
Oswald Spengler, in The Decline of the West pays his respects to
44,, ..... An independent judicial review of discretion is an administrative
function vested in a court." Freund, The Bight to a Judicial Review in Rate
Controversies (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 207, 212. Where constitutional issues
are not involved, "it would be presumptuous on the part of the courts to re-
view the determinations of commissions to the extent of exercising an 'inde-
pendent judgment as to both law and facts,' i.e., in effect, of substituting
the opinion of the courts for that of the commissions, unless, of course, there
was a legislative or constitutional authorization for such an extensive review."
Hardman, The Extent of the Finality of Commissions' Bate Regulations (1922)
28 W. VA. L. Q. 111, 113.
4r The assumption here made is, of course, that the administrative officials
are really experts. This may not be true in many instances. ". . . The
administrative official or agent is not appointed because he is an expert. He
is an expert because he has been appointed to be one." Pound, &upra n. 14,
at 211.
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"all those ethico-politico-social reform-projects which demonstrate,
unanswerably, how things ought to be, and how to set about making
them so- theories that without exception rest upon the hypothesis
that all men are as rich in ideas and as poor in motives as the author
is (or thinks he is). Such theories, even when they have taken the
field armed with the full authority of a religion or the prestige of a
famous name, have not in one single instance effected the slightest
alteration in life. They have merely caused us to think otherwise
than before about life. . . . All world-improvers, priests, and
philosophers are unanimous in holding that life is a fit object for
the nicest meditation, but the life of the world goes its own way
and cares not in the least what is said about it. "40
To one concerned only with results, theory should be of little
importance. The unexpressed premise of Mr. Davis' argument is
that sound legal theory either produces or rationalizes desirable
practical results: if the Supreme Court could get its theory of
the separation of powers straightened out, then it would auto-
matically grind out decisions meeting acceptable pragmatic tests.4
I wonder. A liberal interpretation might well lead to unacceptable
results. We cannot have the pendulum of judicial decision swing-
ing in too wide an are without in large measure destroying the in-
terests of stability, predictability and confidence that I have pre.
viously mentioned. We cannot secure them by following Mr. Davis'
suggestion that:
". .. As administrators become trained to their tasks, prove
their competency and fairness, and command the respect of
those whose rights they affect, the extent of judicial review
may well be diminished."
The frailties of the human body and nature, the uncertainty of
political fortunes, and other like factors render it improbable that
most administrative bodies would have that continuity of personnel
which is essential to the application of the foregoing scheme.
Then there is the lover of pure theory, who wishes the law to
be logical, beautifully symmetrical and consistent. He does not
care about results. He does not demand that Art have a utilitarian
46 SPENLER, THE DECLinE OF THE WEST (1937) Vol. 2, pp. 16-17.
47 That neither the bar nor the legislature considers the Hodges case and
those subsequently decided upon its authority as undesirable, is indicated by
the fact that the proposed judiciary amendment does not vest the circuit courts
with any greater legislative or administrative powers than they now have under
the constitution. See Carlin, The Judiciary Amendment (1939) 45 W. VA. L. Q.
220, 231-232.
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justification for existence. Apparently, Mr. Davis is not a worship-
per at this shrine.
Then, too, there are amusing little ironies in this whole dis-
cussion. Mr. Davis, while leaving the impression that, in some in-
stances at least, administrative boards are more efficient than cir-
cuit courts, nevertheless objects when the supreme court prevents
the latter from completely reviewing the action of the former. On
the other hand, the protestants in the Hodges case had no such
faith in commissions and insisted upon a finding by the circuit
court. Then, they asked- and received - a decision striking
down the jurisdiction of the very court to which they had appealed
for protection and which had afforded it to them by reversing the
findings of the commission on the merits of the case. If what I
have contended for here- finality of the commission's findings
when supported by substantial evidence- had been written into
the act of 1929, the most valuable water power site in the state
would have been irrevocably lost to private enterprise. Thus,
having so little consistency in my own tests of pragmatism, perhaps
I can justify the questioning of Mr. Davis'. But the final irony,
of course, is that practically nobody- least of all the supreme
court- will be influenced by what either of us has written. Mr.
Davis will not, I fear, persuade the court to change its views. He
has, however, made it probable that some lawyer will take advan-
tage of his research in order to have existing legislation held un-
constitutional. Thus, as Felix Kennaston observed, in The Cream
of the Jest, the alchemist seeking the formula for eternal life dis-
covered- gunpowder. Afterwards, he was interested less in the
breakage, than in the horrible noise this accident had occasioned.
25
Donley: The Hodges Case and Beyond
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1939
